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Abstract 
 
This Master Thesis attempts to explain the relationship between CEO 
compensation and company performance in Sweden’s Listed Companies. The 
data collected for this study is from the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The 
main purpose of this study is to see whether the CEO’s bonus is affected by the 
company performance or whether the opposite relationship exists, the CEO’s 
bonus itself has a positive influence on company performance. The study 
involves a general examination of companies from all lists on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange, and it also involves separate tests on companies of various sizes 
as well as from different industry sectors.    
 
The results obtained in this Master Thesis clearly indicate that there is no 
relationship between CEO bonus and company performance among Sweden’s 
Listed Companies. However, certain incentive variables have been identified as 
important performance boosters among companies in certain sectors. We have 
also been able to establish that some of the previous theories regarding incentive 
contracts hold true among companies of certain sizes, and among companies 
from certain sectors.   
  
Key words: CEO Compensation, Company Performance, Incentive Contracts, 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Executive compensation has been a topic of significant debate for a long period. 
A lot of this attention has been on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation, 
and its relationship to company performance. Stockholders seem to be more 
convinced than ever that there is no connection between executive pay and 
company performance. This criticism has its foundation in growing salaries and 
bonuses, in times of poor financial conditions and results. According to agency 
theory, an agency problem exists when an agent, such as a CEO has established 
an agenda which conflicts with the interests of the stockholders. The occurrence 
of a principal agency problem is most likely to happen when an executive has no 
personal financial interest in the outcomes and decisions made (Boyd 1994). 
Hence, a solution to the problem of principal agency conflict can be avoided by 
rewarding the executives on the basis of financial returns to the stockholders. 
 
Executives, like most individuals, are characterized as being risk-averse. The 
implications of such a behavior explain that most executives would want their 
compensation structured in such a way that they bear less personal risk. In order 
to reduce their “personal” risk, executives may engage in activities that reduce 
the firm’s risk. These activities may adversely affect shareholder’s wealth.1 
Previous research done by Holmstrom (1979); Harris and Raviv (1979); 
Grossman and Hart (1983), suggests that tying executive compensation to firm 
performance will motivate the executive to make more value-maximizing 
decisions for the stockholders.   
 
                                                           
1 See Section 2: Principal – Agency Problem – A Description 
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Examples of studies performed in the area of executive compensation have been 
conducted by researchers such as Murthy and Salter (1975); Aupperle, Figler, and 
Lutz (1991); Veliyath and Bishop (1995); Akhigbe, Madura, and Tucker (1995). 
Only the study performed by Veliyath and Bishop (1995) found a strong 
relationship between CEO compensation and company performance. It is 
important to recognize what parameters that can be used in order to evaluate CEO 
performance. Defining compensation as salary and bonus has the advantage of 
providing comparability with other studies of executive compensation, as the 
largest percentage of the prior studies that we have examined have defined 
executive compensation to include only direct cash payments. Our previous 
studies have focused mainly on the return on equity (ROE) for the related 
companies and evaluated the actual cash payments to the CEO. Hence, the base 
salary as well as cash bonuses will be evaluated in this study.  
 
Since there has been dispersion in previous studies regarding the connection 
between CEO compensation and firm performance, we believe it is of great 
interest to perform this Master Thesis in the area of CEO compensation and firm 
performance among companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The principal purpose of this Master Thesis is to examine empirically if there is a 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance among 
companies listed on the Most traded list, Other A-List, Attract 40, or the other O-
List on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.  
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The purpose of this study includes examining the following: 
 
• Is there a correlation between CEO compensation and company performance 
among Sweden’s listed companies traded on the Most traded List, Other A-
List, Attract 40, or the other O-List? 
• Are there any other variables other than company performance that are of 
greater importance when evaluating the CEO compensation? 
• Does bonus or any other CEO related variables enhance company 
performance? 
• Is CEO compensation and company performance affected differently 
depending on the size of the company?    
• Is CEO compensation and company performance affected differently 
depending on which industry sector it belongs to?    
 
We hope that this study will offer a significant contribution to the existing 
literature, since it involves the exploring of Sweden’s Listed Companies, an area 
that has not been previously researched to its full extent.  
 
1.3 Delimitation 
 
The first and most obvious limitation to this Master Thesis is the time limit 
imposed on the study. For this 
Master Thesis 20 weeks have 
been set aside to conduct and 
complete the study. A more 
detailed presentation of the time 
distribution for various parts is 
illustrated in figure 1: 
Figure 1: Time distribution of Master Thesis 
Read 
Articles; 
15%
Data 
Analysis; 
15%
Regression 
Analysis; 
25%
Data 
Collection; 
35%
Conclusion; 
10%
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A second limitation is that the CEO compensation is measured solely by the cash 
compensation. Hence, pension plans, insurance contracts, and severance pay is 
completely omitted from the study. This decision is based on the complexity of 
how to make a fair judgment, and comparison between two separate companies. 
Another cause for this exemption is that many companies chose not to publicize 
this information in their annual reports, which creates complications for us when 
gathering this specific data. 
 
Another limitation is that the content of this study revolves around the CEO’s 
compensation and the company performance. One needs to note that the board of 
directors and other top executives have much to say regarding the overall 
performance of the company. However, in this study all this additional 
information is omitted, and the focus revolves around the CEO alone.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that in some cases where the company 
performance data has not been available in independent databases we have 
gathered this data from annual reports. We are aware that these measures may 
involve some bias, since they are presented by the board to the stockholders. 
However, these annual reports go through thorough investigation by accredited 
accountants, and therefore these figures are believed to be accurate and not 
imposing a bias effect on this study. 
  
1.4 Method 
 
1.4.1 Courses of Action 
 
Our interest in the area of CEO compensation and company performance was 
established after heavy media coverage in the previous year (2002). To further 
enhance our knowledge of the subject matter we have read numerous articles, 
books, and previous research studies in order to gain the knowledge necessary to 
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Company Performance 
 
• Return on Stockholders 
Equity 
• Return on Asset 
• Earnings per Share 
 
CEO Related Variables 
 
• CEO Age 
• Job Tenure 
• Stock Owned 
• Existents of Stock Option 
Program 
CEO Compensation (Cash Payments Only) 
(Salary, Bonus) 
perform a similar study on our own. Throughout our search for knowledge we 
have been exposed to research models that other scholars have applied when 
performing their studies in this area. We have applied a similar model as a 
stepping-stone for our study.2 The next step was to collect the data necessary for 
analysis.3 After the sample selection procedure was completed, and the data set 
was in order, we applied the ordinary least squares (OLS) method in order to run 
our regression models. Before applying the appropriate model for each individual 
test, we tested for econometric problems in our data to secure a data set that will 
lead to valuable results. After the regression models were tested we analyzed the 
results obtained from the econometric models and came up with a conclusion. 
 
1.4.2 Research Model 
 
In order to start our data collection process we have used a model that has been 
applied in previous 
studies by Attaway 
(2000); Murthy and 
Salter (1975); 
Aupperle, Figler, 
and Lutz (1991); 
Akhigbe, Madura, 
and Tucker (1995); 
Madura, Martin,  
  and Jessel (1996); 
and Hall, and Liebman (1998). These researchers have applied a similar model to 
their studies, and we have made a few modifications to this model, and come up 
with the research model presented in Figure 2. 
                                                           
2 See Section 1.4.2: Research Model 
3 See Section 1.4.3: Sample Sampling Procedure 
Figure 2: Research Model 
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This is the extended model that we have used as a stepping-stone for the data 
collection in our research project. As mentioned earlier ROE is the measurement 
used in the previous studies performed. Attaway (2000) notes that ROE as a 
measurement of company performance can be criticized as it may not indicate the 
true underlying performance of the CEO, since this figure can be easily 
manipulated to make the CEO look good. Therefore, we have extended the model 
by including return on asset (ROA), and earnings per share (EPS). Earlier studies 
performed by Murthy and Salter (1975); Aupperle, Figler, and Lutz (1991); and 
Madura, Martin, and Jessel (1996) found no significant relationship between 
CEO compensation, and changes in ROE. However, Veliyath and Bishop (1995) 
were able to distinguish that companies with high ROE reward their CEOs with 
higher cash compensation. These results inspired us to see whether we could test 
additional variables such as ROA, and EPS to see whether they had some 
significant role in the cash compensations for company CEOs.  
 
1.4.3 Sample Selection Procedure 
 
As previously mentioned, our original sample consists of all companies listed on 
the Most traded List, Other A-List, Attract 40, and other O-List. This entails a 
sample of 286 companies. The second constraint of our study requires the 
companies to have had the same CEO appointed for a four-year period (1999-
2002). The application of this constraint has been set forth in order to make sure 
that a CEO has not been employed primarily to “save” a company under harsh 
financial conditions. Hiring a CEO primarily to “save” a company will most 
likely involve higher remuneration even in times of “bad” company performance. 
Therefore, a company that has gone through executive changes during our sample 
period has been eliminated.  
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Another important feature of this study is that it involves data from both small 
firms, as well as large multinational firms. Moreover, it provides the variation 
necessary to conduct statistical tests (Mehran 1995). Another feature of our study 
that might be questioned is the time-period selected. People might argue that it is 
considered a period of large financial distress, and that the results cannot be 
relied upon. However, we believe that the sample period selected will work to our 
advantage, since it involves both large ups 
and downs in the economy. According to 
Gomez-Meija, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987), 
“Pooling performance data into a four or five 
year average reduces variability, provides a 
better long term indicator, and provides a 
more reliable and valid measure of firm 
performance than annual measures”. The 
next action taken was to collect the data for 
each of our variables.4 The data applicable 
for our study was found in the annual reports 
for each respective company, as well as in 
independent accredited databases. The 
annual reports were used primarily to collect 
the CEO specific variables, whereas 
independent accredited databases were used 
for company specific variables. All variable 
data during the four-year period is calculated 
on an annual basis. The complete sample 
selection procedure is illustrated in figure 3. After these criteria have been 
applied we have arrived at a total sample comprised of 65 companies. 
  
                                                           
4 For Explanation of each Variable, see Section 1.4.5. 
Figure 3: Data Sampling Procedure 
Listed on the Most traded List, Other A-
List, Attract 40, or Other O-List 
 
Same CEO for 4 years 
Must Apply a Bonus system 
 
Gather Variables: ROE, ROA, EPS from 
independent accredited database for entire 
sample period 
Availability of annual reports for entire 
sample period. Gather variables: Salary, 
Bonus, CEO Age, Stock Owned, Existence 
of Stock Option Program for CEO  
 
Companies in Sample 
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1.4.4 Reliability and Validity of Study 
 
We believe that the reliability and validity of this study is high, and there are a 
few reasons for this statement. Firstly, all articles and books used for this study 
have been written by what we believe to be highly competent and knowledgeable 
scholars. All articles and books also go through very detailed screening before 
publication, which will further enhance their reliability and validity.  
Moreover, the data collected for the analyses of the study is believed to be of 
high quality since it is gathered from sources that are argued to be reliable. A 
more detailed section regarding the reliability and validity of the data set is 
presented in section 4.3.  
 
Finally, the OLS method used for the statistical portion of this study is a method 
that has been applied in many similar research studies.  
  
1.4.5 Chosen Variables 
 
Company Performance Variables 
The primary focus of this study is on the relationship between CEO 
compensation and company performance, although other factors are included in 
the model as control variables. For this study the performance measures ROE, 
ROA, and EPS are applied. Even though these are very commonly used 
performance measures it is important not to neglect the vitality of other 
performance measures, and the criticism that can be imposed on our study. Two 
of these highly applicable performance measures are Economic Value Added 
(EVA) and Tobin’s Q.5 This study is using traditional performance measures as 
an attempt to measure the impact of investment decisions relative to the firm’s 
invested capital. 
 
                                                           
5 See Appendix 1 for further explanation of these performance measures. 
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ROE. The company ROE is equal to the return from investments relative to the 
equity invested.6 ROE represents the return the company is making on 
shareholders’ funds in the company. It reflects how much the company has 
earned on the funds invested by the shareholders, and is, therefore, an important 
ratio when interpreting a company’s performance. It is important to note that 
ROE can be calculated in various ways. The formula presented in this Master 
Thesis is the formula applied by Ecovision AB who supplied the data for Dagens 
Industri.  
 
ROA. ROA measures the return to shareholders relative to the total assets of the 
firm. The firm’s ROA is affected by the financing decisions of the firm, since net 
income includes the impact of after-tax interest payments to debt holders.7 ROA 
indicates how efficient the company is in generating profits with the assets it 
holds. The rate of return provides information on management’s efficiency in 
using available resources to make profits. As well as ROE there are different 
ways of calculating ROA, and the formula presented here is the one applied by 
Ecovision AB.  
     
EPS8. EPS is probably one of the most popular performance measures. By nature 
it is very straightforward since you add up all the money a company earns, and 
divide it by the number of shares outstanding.9      
 
CEO Related Variables 
The CEO’s remuneration may be dependent on each individual’s characteristics 
as well as the specific factors of each company. Certain specific characteristics of 
a CEO including their development of human capital, knowledge, or degree of 
                                                           
6 ROE = Net Result / Average Equity  
7 ROA = Net Result / Average Assets  
8 EPS = Amount of Net Income / Total Number of Outstanding Shares 
9  http://news.morningstar.com/news/MS/Stocks101/neweps.html  
- 10 - 
control and interest in the firm may affect their perceived value to the firm 
(Madura, Martin, and Jessell 1996). Four CEO specific factors have been 
identified in this study. 
 
CEO age. The compensation of the CEO may be positively correlated to the 
amount of human capital that has been accumulated throughout their employment 
period. Older CEOs have more years of experience and hence, a longer period of 
accumulation of this specific human capital. It is, therefore, hypothesized that 
older CEOs are rewarded for this particular characteristic (IBID).  
 
CEO Tenure. In our study CEO tenure is the constraint that the CEO must have 
held his present position for the entire sample period (1999-2002)10. 
 
Stock Ownership. A CEO with a higher proportion of ownership is believed to act 
different than a CEO with no personal interest in the company. A CEO with a 
larger stake in the firm has more incentive to perform, since part of his own 
wealth is affected.11  
 
Existence of Stock Option Program for CEO. It is argued that one specific way to 
motivate a CEO to make more value maximizing decisions is to reward the CEO 
a greater portion of his remuneration as equity based, through incentive stock 
options (Jensen, and Murphy 1990). 
 
CEO Compensation Variables 
Base Salary. The fixed amount paid out to the CEO during the course of the year. 
The base salary is paid out independently of any results achieved over the year. 
 
                                                           
10 The CEO Tenure was further explained in Section 1.4.3: Sample Selection Procedure 
11 See Section 2:  Principal – Agency Problem – A Description 
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Bonus. A bonus is the variable cash compensation paid out to the CEO during the 
year. The bonus will be paid out at the end of the year and it is not fixed before 
the year has started. The bonus will most likely be paid out after certain barriers 
have been broken or specific results have been accomplished.  
 
1.4.6 Statistical Method 
 
The statistical method chosen for this study is the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method in order to test our hypotheses. The OLS method serves as the best linear 
unbiased estimator (B.L.U.E.) between two or more variables. Since our study 
involves more than one independent variable, we have applied multiple 
regression analysis. In multiple regression analysis two or more independent 
variables serves to explain variations in the dependent variable, Y (Ogden 2003 
p.29). By performing multiple regression analysis one can obtain exact figures 
representing the statistical significance between the different relationships among 
the various variables. For the implementation of the OLS method we have 
applied Microsoft Excel computer software. 
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2 Principal – Agency Problem – A Description  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes 
of social interaction. We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between 
two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or 
as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of 
decision problems” (Ross 1973). The core of the theory of the principal and the 
agent derives from one of the major concerns of incentive theory. The basic idea 
of this theory focuses on the cost of performing a certain task, executed by the 
agent (in this study, the CEO). The agent is hired by the principal (in this study, 
the stockholders) based on his knowledge and skills, in order to execute certain 
decisions in the “best” interest of the principal. The central concern in this theory 
can be found in the question regarding how the principal can motivate the agent 
to perform at the top of his ability, in order to satisfy the principal. The 
difficulties of this “monitoring” of the agent can be explained in that an agent 
tends to engage in a high level of self-interest activities. Therefore, it is of great 
importance that the principal can motivate, and reward the agent to perform, as 
the principal would prefer (Sappington 1991).   
 
The theory of the principal agency problem is highly related to this research study 
of the correlation of CEO compensation and company performance, since the 
CEO might not always act in the best interest of the stockholders. The bonus 
system applied in many of the companies listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange, is an action imposed by the stockholders in order to motivate the 
CEOs, and also a way to try to convert a generally risk adverse CEO to become 
more risk neutral. An executive is reluctant to make risky decisions since he is 
always exposed to the risk of getting laid off when an action is taken that does 
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not satisfy the principals. Hence, the executive tends to act in a risk adverse 
manner, whereas a stockholder is more risk neutral since they have the possibility 
to diversify their portfolios (Mehran 1995). 
 
One of the main issues in a principal agency relationship is the construction of a 
contract. The procedure followed when a contract is created is that the principal 
will design the terms of the contract. The contract will contain, and specify the 
rules and engagements whereby the agent is expected to obey, as well as the 
remuneration that will be paid out upon completion of the conditions of the 
contract. After the offer to the agent has been made, the agent will decide 
whether he will accept or reject the conditions of the contract set forth. Upon 
rejection the contract is terminated, whereas an acceptance by the agent will 
begin his “employment”. The final procedure of the contract is the observance of 
the agent’s performance, and the payments of the remuneration will be paid out 
as stipulated in the contract (Sappington 1991).   
 
2.2 Ownership 
 
An agency problem may arise whenever the CEO does not own 100% of the 
shares of the company. This can be explained by the fact that one does not feel 
the same motivation to perform well at any time when it is not ones own wealth 
that is at stake. According to Hart (1995 p. 127), the fact that the CEO does not 
own all the outstanding stock creates two new issues. First, those who own the 
company, the shareholders, are too small, and too numerous, to be able to 
perform and engage in day-to-day activities. In order to cope with this dilemma, 
control is given to the Board of Directors, which in turn, delegates the 
responsibility to the executives. Hence, separation of control and ownership is 
created. Secondly, dispersed shareholders have little or no incentive to take part 
in the day-to-day monitoring activities. This can be explained by the fact that 
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monitoring is very costly and the creation of wealth will be shared between all 
shareholders. The idea of this creation of wealth gives birth to a free rider 
problem where shareholders try to take advantage of the situation at no individual 
cost. The solution to this free rider problem can be solved when one person or 
institution acquires a large stake in order to be in charge of the monitoring. In 
order to apply the problem of ownership, and its effect on CEO performance in 
this study, the percentage of outstanding stock owned by the CEO has been 
considered. The reason for the addition of this variable is to see whether a CEO 
with a larger stake in the company tends to perform better than a CEO with a 
small or non-existing stake in the company.  
 
2.3 Managerial Opportunistic Behavior- “Empire Building” 
 
Managerial opportunistic behavior is a phenomenon that is grounded in the 
egocentric behavior of human nature. It can be explained as the actions taken by 
an executive who does not act in the best interest of the shareholders, but rather 
tries to expand the firm, and its entity at any price. According to Ross, 
Westerfield, and Jaffe (2002 p.15), an executive left alone would rather try to 
maximize the corporate wealth instead of the shareholder wealth, unless the right 
incentives are presented. This “Empire Building”, where an executive is only 
acting in the best interest of himself in order to make ones own name immortal, is 
a common problem in large companies. According to principal agency theory, 
one of the toughest issues to deal with is the separation between ownership and 
control. Hart (1995 p. 128) presents a possible solution to this issue by suggesting 
that managers put on the right incentive scheme will reorganize their priorities. 
However, an incentive scheme might work as a motivating force and boost the 
overall effort of the executive, but it will be less effective in getting executives to 
cut back on the “Empire building”. This can be explained by the fact that 
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executives with high “personal” ambitions, are not willing to give up these extra 
perquisites, and benefits at a low cost for the shareholders.   
 
 
2.4 Managerial Entrenchment 
 
Managerial Entrenchment is a concept that involves the decision whether a firm 
should be liquidated or not. It is a typical principal agent problem since the best 
interest of the stockholders and the executives might be different. Under certain 
conditions the optimal decision for the stockholders might be to liquidate the firm 
in order to yield a certain pay-off. The executive might realize his limitations and 
not see any possibilities for expanding his enterprise. Hence, his only goal is to 
avoid liquidation (Hart 1995 p.131). As one can understand, liquidation would 
result in a more efficient solution for the shareholders since it would 
accommodate a positive pay-off before an eventual bankruptcy. However, a 
manager acts on behalf of his own best interest, in order to hold on to his position 
and be rewarded his remuneration. He is not willing to sacrifice his job, and 
remuneration to bear the risk of being unemployed, even though it would be the 
better solution for the stockholders.     
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3 Incentive Contracts 
  
As mentioned previously, one of the major complications in a firm involves the 
separation of ownership and control. This complication will occur any time the 
CEO does not own 100 % of the outstanding shares, hence does not have the 
same self interest in the performance of the firm as the rest of the stockholders. 
So what can be done in order to motivate the CEO to perform well, and become 
more risk-neutral? This problem can be solved through the implication of 
different incentive programs. According to a study conducted by Nordic Investor 
Services there are currently nine different types of employee incentive programs 
in Sweden’s Listed Companies (Nordic Investor Services 2003). Implicit 
incentive schemes represent highly incomplete contracts. This is grounded in two 
significant factors: the difficulty in determining desirable performance prior to 
the activity performed, and the difficulty of measuring the actual performance 
once it is completed (Milgrom and Roberts 1992 p. 402). Part of the problem 
involving the contracts and the incompleteness thereof, can be explained by the 
asymmetric information, and moral hazard separating the CEO, and the 
stockholders. Yet this problem of defining performance in advance can be 
prevented through the application of an explicit incentive contract, since there 
may be a proxy for good overall performance. From a stockholders point of view, 
the stock price performance might be a very good indication of the CEO’s 
performance, and serve as a quite adequate “summary statistic” of the same 
(IBID p. 403). 
 
3.1 Types of Incentive Contracts 
 
There are some points regarding the characteristics of the incentive contracts and 
such contracts that are considered more or less favorable in certain situations. As 
stated by Mehran (1995), Jensen and Murphy suggest that making a greater 
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percentage of the CEO’s compensation equity based, such as through stock-
options, will motivate the CEO to take on more risk. Consequently, the CEO will 
abandon his natural risk-adversity and become more risk-neutral. Moreover, 
Mehran (1995) himself regressed CEO age towards different types of 
compensation and found a significant result for the application of cash 
compensation. He further explains this result that older CEO’s may prefer cash 
compensation because of their shorter employment horizon. The following CEO 
incentive programs have been identified by Milgrom and Roberts (1992 p.425): 
 
Salary. Fixed amount paid over the course of the year. The salary can be changed 
from year to year based on length of service, previous performance, years of 
tenure, cost of living (inflation), or other considerations. 
 
Bonus. A variable amount often paid as a lump sum at the end of the year, or the 
following year. The bonus is based on performance and is often tied to a certain 
performance criteria. A bonus is normally paid out if certain performance criteria 
or boundaries have been exceeded. 
 
Stock Options. A stock option gives the CEO the right to purchase stock in the 
firm at a pre-set price that is at or above the current price of the stock. This offer 
is valid for a certain time period and will encourage the CEO to increase the stock 
price in order to earn the difference between the pre-set stock price and the future 
stock price.  
 
(Restricted) Stock Awards. Restricted stock awards are shares given to the CEO, 
or sold to the CEO at a deep discount. Certain restrictions are tied to these stocks. 
These restrictions may imply that the stocks cannot be sold within a certain time 
horizon, or they cannot be sold until certain performance criteria have been met. 
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Past performance may serve as a determinant of the number of stocks awarded to 
the CEO. 
 
Phantom Stock Plans. Phantom stock plans are stocks that carry no ownership 
claims, since it entitles the CEO to receive the stock price appreciation, and 
dividends that would have been collected on actual stock. 
 
Stock Appreciation Rights. Right to collect appreciation on stock for a pre-
determined number of stocks, for a certain time period. 
 
3.2 Motivating Risk Taking 
 
Perhaps the most congruent way for a middle level executive to climb the 
corporate hierarchy is through a promotion tournament. This possibility of 
promotion is non-existent for a CEO since he has already “won” the promotion 
tournament. Therefore, it is of great importance not to forget that since there are 
no more promotions to win, the CEO has become very risk adverse since he does 
not want to be removed from his top position. This implies that there are no more 
financial incentives for the CEO to perform well. 
 
Because of the obvious problem that the CEO has no incentive to advance in the 
hierarchy, since he is now in the “drivers seat”, and therefore does not want to 
take on any additional risk, and bear the possibility of being laid off from this 
golden seat, incentive programs imposed by the stockholders will eliminate some 
of this risk adversity. It is important that these incentive programs involve great 
benefits, and perquisites, since the position earned by the CEO is not one that he 
is willing to give up easily. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992 p. 431) 
incentive programs are meant to serve as an insurance policy, since their main 
purpose is to reward the CEO for good performance, without having them bear 
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the costs of an eventual failure. It is important to recognize that punishing them 
for failure would emphasize the risk they already face, and impose an even more 
risk adverse attitude towards project recommendations. One of the most prevalent 
actions imposed by the stockholders in order to boost the risk taking by the CEO 
is the implementation of severance pay. Severance pay serves as insurance for the 
CEO, since he will be paid this severance pay in a case of involuntary 
unemployment, caused by bad performance.   
 
3.3 Performance Pay for CEOs 
 
People argue about the huge amounts of remuneration paid out to company 
CEOs. Some CEOs are paid immense amounts, which creates lots of criticism. 
However, the amounts paid out are normally only a small fraction of the earnings 
of the entire firm. Hence, the argument should not circulate around the amount 
the CEOs are paid, rather it should be investigated whether these large amounts 
provide the right incentives for the CEO to engage in value maximizing 
decisions. Milgrom and Roberts (1992 p. 433) note that various observers have 
concluded that the growing salary gap between CEOs and average workers is 
destructive to company morale, and complicates the efficiency of a firm to run 
daily activities smoothly. If this is the case, large increases in CEO compensation 
during times when workers are laid off, will be considered destructive and not 
result in value maximization of the shareholder value. “Yet the overwhelming 
evidence is that, on average, CEOs’ pay and wealth are responsive to company 
performance. The issue is whether they are appropriately so” (IBID p. 433). 
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4 Model Design and Development  
 
Before implementing the econometric models it is important to illustrate the 
selected data, and the econometric complications that may occur when 
performing these tests. In this section we will present the different variables, the 
testing models, as well as the justifications that have been made in order to avoid 
econometric problems. 
 
4.1 Population assumptions 
    
Our sample includes 65 companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange on 
the Most Traded List, Other A-List, Attract 40, and Other O-List. The companies 
are from all nine sectors identified by Affärsvärlden12. These nine sectors are 
further grouped into four groups consisting of companies in related sectors. The 
complete company selection procedure was previously explained in section 1.4.3. 
 
4.2 Data Collected 
 
The following data was collected for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 
• CEO Age 
• Fixed Salary 
• Bonus 
• Percentage of stock owned by CEO 
• ROE 
• ROA 
• EPS 
• Existence of Stock Option Program 
• Company Sector 
• Market Value of Shares  
                                                           
12 See Appendix 2 for more detailed Industry Sector explanation   
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4.3 Reliability and Validity of Raw Data 
 
The raw data is the heart of the analysis. Therefore, it is vital that one proceed 
with all necessary precautions when collecting the data in order to avoid 
unreliability and invalidity.  
 
In this paper the focus has been on the reliability and validity of the secondary 
data collected. The reliability and validity of the data is believed to be high since 
most of the data regarding salaries, bonuses, stock-option programs, and 
ownership was collected from annual reports which go through careful screening 
by accredited accountants before publication. By law, companies are required to 
specify the salary paid out to the CEO, and chairman of the board. Additionally, 
any bonus, or tantiem, paid out to the CEO needs to be presented separately. As 
far as the performance variables, ROE, ROA, and EPS they are predominately 
collected from Dagens Industri, which is an independent source. To further 
complete missing data we have used annual reports, as well as Affärsdata.  
 
4.4 Qualitative Variables with Several Categories (Dummy Variables) 
 
Many qualitative factors have more than two categories. In our study we have 
added dummy variables in order to account for qualitative factors. A dummy 
variable take on two values, 0 or 1, in order to indicate the presence or absence of 
the related variable. In our study we have added dummy variables in order to 
indicate the existence of a stock option program for the CEO, industry sector, and 
company size. 
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The dummies are defined as follow: 
 
D0 =     
 
Industry sector dummies 
 
D1 =            D2 =    
 
D3 =              D4 = 
 
Company size dummies 
 
D5 =              D6 = 
 
 
D7 = 
 
It is important to notice that in section 5, when we applied our econometric 
model, one dummy variable for industry sector, and one dummy variable for 
company size has been omitted. Failure to omit one variable would create a 
model containing exact collinearity. This error is usually referred to as falling 
into the dummy variable trap (Hill, Griffiths, and Judge 2001 p.207). 
Technically it does not matter which dummy variable is omitted, so for this study, 
we have chosen to omit the industry sector dummy D1, and company size dummy 
D5.    
 
4.5 Econometric Models Applied for Research Study   
 
In order to test our selected variables, dependent and explanatory, it is important 
to construct an appropriate econometric model so that one gets a clear picture of 
the testing procedure. Since CEO compensation and company performance is a 
1 Existence of stock option program 
0 Otherwise 
1 Raw Materials and Industrial  
0 Otherwise 
1 Consumer goods, Pharmaceuticals and Service 
0 Otherwise 
1 Telecommunication, IT, Media & Entertainment 
0 Otherwise 
1 Financial 
0 Otherwise 
1 Small Size 
0 Otherwise 
1 Medium Size 
0 Otherwise 
1 Large Size 
0 Otherwise 
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situation that can be looked at from a counter-cyclical perspective, it is very 
important not to neglect the possibility that company performance may affect the 
CEO bonus, in the same way that a CEO bonus might be a reason for increased 
performance by the CEO. Therefore, different econometric models need to be 
applied in order to capture the different possible relationships between the 
company performance and CEO compensation. Furthermore, we have created 
separate models in order to test the possibility of varying results within different 
industry sectors in the economy, as well as if companies of different sizes behave 
differently resulting in other outcomes. 
 
The econometric models constructed in order to fulfill the purpose of this study 
are presented as follows: 
 
Does company performance or any other variables affect CEO bonus?   
 
BONUS =  
β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5ROE+β6ROA+β7EPS+δ0D0+δ1D1+δ2D2+δ3D3+δ4D4+δ5D5+δ6D6+δ7
D7+e                             
Econometric Model 1: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Does bonus or any other variables affect company performance? 
 
ROE =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+δ1D1+δ2D2+δ3D3+δ4D4+δ5D5+δ6D6+δ7D7+e                            
Econometric Model 2: ROE as dependent variable 
 
ROA =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+δ1D1+δ2D2+δ3D3+δ4D4+δ5D5+δ6D6+δ7D7+e                            
Econometric Model 3: ROA as dependent variable 
 
EPS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+δ1D1+δ2D2+δ3D3+δ4D4+δ5D5+δ6D6+δ7D7+e                            
Econometric Model 4: EPS as dependent variable 
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Is CEO compensation and company performance affected differently depending 
on the size of the company?    
 
In order to test the difference in compensation structures between companies of 
different sizes we have divided our sample into three groups, small, medium, and 
large, depending on the market share value. After the sample was divided into 
these various groups we applied the following regression models: 
 
BONUS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5ROE+β6ROA+β7EPS+δ0D0+e   
ROE =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+e 
ROA =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+e  
EPS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+e 
Econometric Model 5: Effect of each variable for respective company size 
 
Is CEO compensation and company performance affected differently depending 
on which industry sector it belongs to?    
 
The first step in order to test the significance of our respective variables in each 
industry sector was to divide the sample into groups containing similar sectors. 
As previously mentioned we have nine different sectors. Some sectors include a 
very low number of companies. Therefore, we have grouped similar sectors 
together and we have obtained four different industry groups. We are aware that 
some industry groups consist of a very low number of observations, but we still 
believe that performing regression analysis on each industry group could lead to 
some valuable information that we do not want to lose out on.  The following 
regression model was applied for this test: 
 
BONUS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5ROE+β6ROA+β7EPS+δ0D0+e   
ROE =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+e 
ROA =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+e  
EPS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+δ0D0+e 
Econometric Model 6: Effect of each variable for respective industry group  
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4.6 Econometric Problems and Actions Taken 
 
When analyzing data involving time-series data, and cross sectional data using 
econometric models it is important to recognize some of the problems that may 
occur. Since this study involves both of these types of data we are aware of some 
of the complications that we might face. These involve autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, as well as multicollinearity.  
 
4.6.1 Autocorrelation 
 
Autocorrelation exists when the current error term contains not only the effects of 
current shocks, but also the carryover from previous shocks. When circumstances 
such as these lead to error terms that are correlated, autocorrelation exists. 
Therefore, anytime that one is dealing with time-series data the possibility of 
autocorrelation should be considered (Hill, Griffiths, and Judge 2001 p.258). We 
are aware that the inertia in the state of the market may be apparent in an 
upcoming year and not only affect the current year. However, since our study 
takes place over a four year period the testing for autocorrelation would result in 
two degrees of freedom, which is a very low number to base any assumptions on. 
Therefore, our judgment has been not to test for autocorrelation since we believe 
that the inertia in the state of the market would not result in any evidence of 
autocorrelation. Rather, the only action imposed by us in order to enhance the 
quality of our testing was to place the bonus in the year that it was earned, rather 
then when it was realized.     
 
4.6.2 Heteroskedasticity 
 
Heteroskedasticity exists when the variances for all observations are not the 
same. The existence of heteroskedasticity is often encountered when one is using 
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cross-sectional data.13 When testing for heteroskedasticity one can either plot the 
residuals or perform a Goldfeld-Quant test. The Goldfeldt-Quant test is 
considered the standard procedure since it compares the linear specification of a 
model to a ratio model wherein some proxy for size deflates all variables (Ciscel, 
and Carroll 1980). We decided to plot the residuals and look for a pattern in the 
graph. A pattern indicates heteroskedasticity, whereas a graph showing no pattern 
is a sign of homoskedasticity. 
 
4.6.3 Multicollinearity 
 
According to Hill, Griffiths, and Judge (2001 p.180), data that is the result of an 
uncontrolled experiment may cause many of the different variables to move 
together in systematic ways. When this is the case the variables are said to be 
collinear, or multicollinear when several variables are involved in the 
econometric testing. This will impose a problematic stage when trying to evaluate 
the results since it may not be possible to capture the economic relationship or the 
parameters of interest. This is highly applicable to our study since it involves a 
number of different variables. “To eliminate multicollinearity, some 
transformation of the data is necessary. Unfortunately, such transformed variables 
often bear only the faintest relationship to the hypothesis being tested” (Ciscel, 
and Carroll 1980). One simple way to detect collinear relationships is to test for 
the correlation coefficient between pairs of variables. If the correlation coefficient 
between any of these different pairs of explanatory variables is greater then 0.8 or 
0.9 in absolute value, it is argued that it would serve as an indication of a strong 
linear relationship, and cause potential harm to the analysis (Hill, Griffiths, and 
                                                           
13 If we have a linear regression model with heteroskedasticity, and we use the least squares estimator to estimate 
the unknown coefficients, the least squares estimator is still a linear and unbiased estimator. However, it is no 
longer the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator. (B.L.U.E). This will also cause the standard errors computed for the 
least squares estimators to be incorrect, and the confidence intervals and hypothesis tests to be misleading. (Hill, 
Griffiths, and Judge 2001 p. 238) 
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Judge 2001 p.190). In order to cope with this problem of multicollinearity a 
correlation matrix has been constructed.14   
 
4.6.4 F-Test: Test of Significance  
 
We have also applied a multiple restriction F-test, and run an F-distribution test. 
The F-test will distinguish whether we can reject our null hypotheses and 
determine if one or more of our variables is of significance. The way we have 
performed the F-test was by splitting our data into two groups, one including 
large companies, and one including small companies. In order to split the data 
into small and large companies we looked at the market share value for respective 
company (Fristedt, Sundin, and Sundqvist 2003), and split the sample into two 
equal halves. The following formula has been applied for the F-test (Hill, 
Griffiths, and Judge 2001 p.209): 
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When determining between sums of squares restricted and sums of squares 
unrestricted two different regression models were applied. The models applied 
are as follow: 
 
BONUS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5ROE+β6ROA+β7EPS+e   
ROE =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+e 
ROA =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+e  
EPS =  β1+β2AGE+β3SALARY+β4OWNERSHIP+β5BONUS+e 
Econometric Model 7: Restricted model for F-test 
 
The model applied for the unrestricted sums of squares F-test is identical to the 
econometric models 1-4 presented in section 4.5. 
                                                           
14 See Section 5.2  
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4.7 Quick Overview of Year by Year Numbers for each Variable 
 
This section will serve as a quick presentation of our sample variables. Each 
variable will be presented separately in a four year table illustrating the minimum 
values, maximum values, standard deviation, etc. Even though it cannot be seen 
as a result of this study per se, it gives a quick and interesting overview of the 
situation in Sweden’s Listed Companies. Each table is presented separately 
below: 
 
Year by Year Presentation of Bonus Variable 
                        % Bonus of Base Salary 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 142 288 154 129 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Mean 27 28 22 19 
Median 20 7 7 4 
Stdev 35 47 35 28 
Table 1: Bonus Variable 
 
As illustrated above, one can clearly see that average bonuses hit their peak in 
2000, which also was a year with good overall financial results. After this peak it 
is clear that there has been a decrease in the bonuses among our selected 
companies. This may be a result of either poor performance or a decrease in the 
general market. 
 
Year by Year Presentation of Base Salary Variable 
                     CEO Base Salary (000,s SEK) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 8800 9240 9598 10418 
Min 467 466 611 630 
Mean 1962 2256 2504 2693 
Median 1403 1558 1890 1938 
Stdev 1675 1859 2050 2270 
Table 2: Base Salary Variable 
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Base salary among CEO’s has increased each year during our study. An increase 
in salary is probably a reflection of both longer tenure held by the CEO, as well 
as increased cost of living imposed by yearly inflation. 
 
Year by Year Presentation of Age Variable 
                                     CEO Age 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 58 59 60 61 
Min 37 38 39 40 
Mean 48.1 49.1 50.1 51.1 
Median 49 50 51 52 
Stdev 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Table 3: Age Variable 
 
The age table obviously illustrates a one year increase in age since the same CEO 
is presented for the duration of our study. What is interesting to note is average 
age of the CEO, as well as the standard deviation of the same since this is an 
indication of the general age group of CEOs as well as the dispersion of age 
among the CEOs.  
 
Year by Year Presentation of Ownership Variable 
% of Outstanding Share Owned by CEO 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 52.17 46.84 47.22 51.89 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean 6.38 5.72 5.46 5.38 
Median 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.19 
Stdev 12.52 11.49 10.96 11.01 
Table 4: Ownership Variable 
 
The table above representing the percentage of ownership held by the CEO 
during this four year period shows a decrease in the amount of ownership held by 
the CEO. It is hard to determine the cause of these figures. However, one 
explanation might be that a CEO is sitting on a lot of valuable information, and in 
times of harsh financial distress he may be able to observe this situation before 
many of the stockholders, and in order to save his own wealth he may sell off 
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some of his personal stake in the company, and thereby decrease his personal 
loss. 
 
Year by Year Presentation of ROE Variable 
                                   ROE (in %)   
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 53.80 51.00 47.20 41.60 
Min -60.47 -73.82 -134.30 -176.10 
Mean 12.61 12.89 2.36 0.79 
Median 16.80 15.20 10.95 8.15 
Stdev 19.84 19.26 31.35 30.19 
Table 5: ROE Variable 
 
The table above indicate the trend of a continuous decrease in the performance 
variable ROE. One might argue that this trend is quite obvious since the market 
has experienced a harsh environment over the past few years, and a performance 
variable like ROE will serve as a strong indication of this. Yet another indication 
of the great fluctuation in the market can be seen in the increasing standard 
deviation for this variable. 
  
Year by Year Presentation of ROA Variable 
ROA (in %) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 78.40 52.00 55.20 56.50 
Min -48.46 -50.50 -78.10 -100.90 
Mean 14.95 13.01 2.22 1.44 
Median 12.90 12.90 7.90 5.20 
Stdev 17.20 15.01 21.83 20.10 
Table 6: ROA Variable 
 
Just like the previous table, the table above indicates a decreasing trend in the 
ROA. Since both ROE and ROA are traditional accounting measurements one 
might think that they tend to follow similar trends and the tables above indicate 
just that.  
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Year by Year Presentation of EPS Variable 
EPS (in SEK) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Max 97.49 57.31 41.78 20.54 
Min -7.57 -6.66 -37.74 -15.23 
Mean 6.67 6.82 3.53 2.62 
Median 3.75 4.93 3.80 3.28 
Stdev 14.16 9.37 9.85 7.43 
Table 7: EPS Variable 
 
EPS has shown a decreasing trend after its peak year in 2000. What can be seen is 
the decrease in variation that is visible in the standard deviation presented over 
the sample period. 
 
Four Year Average for each Variable 
 
 
 
 
4 Yr. Avg. 
 
 
 
 
CEO Age 
CEO 
Base 
Salary    
(in 000's 
SEK) 
 
 
% Bonus 
of Base  
Salary 
 
% of 
Outstanding 
Shares Owned 
by CEO 
 
 
 
ROE    
(in %) 
 
 
 
ROA     
(in %) 
 
 
 
EPS    
(in SEK) 
Max 59.5 9514 178 49.53 48.40 60.53 54.28 
Min 38.5 544 0 0.00 -111.17 -69.49 -16.80 
Mean 49.6 2354 24 5.73 7.16 7.90 4.91 
Median 50.5 1697 16 0.17 12.78 9.73 3.94 
Stdev 6.1 1964 36 11.50 25.16 18.53 10.20 
Table 8: Four Year Average 
 
The table above serves as a complete overview of the entire sample period 
presenting the average number for each variable. It may serve as an interesting 
benchmark in an eventual comparison to an individual year. 
 
4.8 Final Thought 
 
We now turn to share the findings of our study. We hope you observe the 
findings of our work carefully as they may serve as valuable knowledge 
enhancing information. But, at the same time we hope you think critically and 
objectively as you read. We would rather that you read with great caution, and 
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impartial objectivity, than that you blindly and unquestioningly accept our 
results.  
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5 Empirical Findings and Result 
 
This section will present the findings of our study, and present the results 
obtained from our econometric models illustrated in section 4. The first step 
before performing our multiple regressions was to test for some of the 
complications mentioned in sections, 4.6.2, and 4.6.3. After this procedure was 
completed and no complications were detected, we moved on to the core 
analyses, which will serve as the empirical findings of our study.  
 
5.1 Testing for heteroskedasticity 
 
 
The first problem with heteroskedasticity was dealt with by plotting the residuals 
from the initial regression analyses. The residuals from each of the econometrics 
models 1-4 were plotted in order to decide if any pattern was present. A pattern 
indicates heteroskedasticity, and as one can see in Appendix 3 we were not able 
to detect a pattern in any of the four residual plots, hence the presence of 
homoskedasticity is observed. This indicates that our data does not contain any 
differences in the variance and no additional precautions are necessary in order to 
avoid heteroskedasticity.  
 
5.2 Multicollinearity   
 
As mentioned in section 4.6.3, we concluded that a correlation between two 
variables that exceed 0.8 or 0.9 indicates a strong linear relationship that could 
cause eventual harm to the final results. In order to test for multicollinearity we 
constructed a correlation matrix.15 As indicated by the correlation matrix none of 
our variables are highly correlated, since neither of them show a correlation of 
above 0.8, between any two pairs of variables. 
                                                           
15 See Appendix 4 
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5.3 F-Test: Test of Significance 
 
The next step was to perform an F-test in order to see whether we can reject our 
null hypotheses, and conclude that one or more of our variables are of 
significance. We can conclude that we can reject our null hypotheses for all four 
F-tests performed, since all of our F-distribution values are above the Right-Tail 
Critical Values for the F-Distribution.16 Moreover, at least one of our variables is 
of significance. 
 
5.4 Brief explanation of Summary Statistics 
 
The R2 is a descriptive measure of the goodness of fit. It measures the proportion 
of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by variation in the 
explanatory variable. However, R2 itself does not measure the quality of the 
regression model. When using a regression model the objective is not to look at 
the model resulting in the highest R2. Although the R2 in our regression models 
are very low, they can be viewed as sufficient, since regression studies using 
cross-sectional data normally record very low values of R2 (Hill, Griffiths, and 
Judge 2001 p.125).    
 
A relatively high standard error in comparison to the value of the coefficient 
indicates that the result cannot be considered relevant. This is because in 
comparison to the coefficient, the standard error is too large. The t-stat value 
equals the coefficient value divided by the standard error. The P-value of a test is 
calculated by finding the probability that the t-distribution can have a value that is 
greater than or equal to the absolute sample value of the test statistics (IBID 
p.104). The majority of the previous research studies have selected a significance 
level of 0.05 Therefore, we have selected a significance level of 0.05 for our 
study. 
                                                           
16 See Appendix 5 
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5.5 Does company performance or any other variables affect CEO bonus?  
 
When testing whether company performance or any other variables had any 
significant effect on CEO bonus we applied econometric model 1, presented in 
section 4.5. The result obtained from this model is illustrated below: 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.438285 
R2 0.192093 
R2 adjusted 0.152843 
Standard Error 33.95531 
Observations 260 
 
  
Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
Intercept 38.6119 20.7517 1.8607 0.0640 
CEO Age -0.3034 0.3892 -0.7795 0.4365 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 0.5264 0.5991 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.7009 0.2049 -3.4203 0.0007 
Stock option program -2.8639 4.7417 -0.6040 0.5464 
Raw materials and Industrials -8.4522 6.0724 -1.3919 0.1652 
Financial sector -2.6491 6.7486 -0.3925 0.6950 
IT-sector, Telecommunication and Media 
& Entertainment 
 
-13.2240 
 
7.8470 
 
-1.6852 
 
0.0932 
Medium sized firms 10.1582 5.7098 1.7791 0.0765 
Large sized firms 21.7623 7.7197 2.8190 0.0052 
ROE 0.1498 0.1938 0.7727 0.4405 
ROA -0.1138 0.2585 -0.4404 0.6600 
EPS  -0.0189 0.2338 -0.0807 0.9358 
Table 22: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
The table above clearly indicates that none of the performance variables, ROE, 
ROA, or EPS, are of any significance for the dependent bonus variable since they 
do not fall within the 0.05 significance level. This indicates that the performance 
of the company does not affect the amount of the bonus paid out to the CEO. This 
finding supports the conclusions made by previous research studies performed by 
Murthy and Salter (1975); Aupperle, Figler, and Lutz (1991); and Madura, 
Martin, and Jessel (1996). 
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However, we have been able to identify other variables that are of significance 
for the bonus variable. The percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO 
indicates a negative relationship to the bonus. This result is something that one 
can expect since a high percentage of ownership will motivate the CEO, and 
create an incentive to perform well, since an increase in stock price will lead to 
an increase in wealth for the CEO. Therefore, a high percentage of ownership 
itself will serve as a good enough incentive for the CEO, and a bonus might not 
be considered necessary in this situation. An additional hypothesis to this 
negative relationship between bonus and equity based compensation may be 
explained by the different tax conditions for cash compensation, and equity based 
earnings. A CEO that is paid in cash will most likely pay tax for this bonus based 
on a tax-bracket that is substantially higher than the 30% tax rate for earnings on 
equity. Therefore, a CEO that is on the boarder of a higher tax-bracket will view 
equity based compensation as more favorable than cash compensation since it 
will prevent him from being taxed at a higher rate. Obviously it is important to 
consider the higher risk involved in equity based compensation compared to cash 
bonuses.      
 
Secondly, we have discovered that large firms tend to have a positive relationship 
to bonuses. One might think of a few possible explanations as to why bonuses are 
significant in large firms. One obvious explanation might be that a CEO for a 
large firm is sort of “sitting on top of the world”, and the risks involved in such a 
position are rather large. A bad performance will lead to unemployment and the 
possibility of obtaining a similar position might be very hard to accomplish, 
because of a shattered track record. However, the most plausible explanation 
might be that a CEO’s ownership in a large firm is considerably lower in 
comparison to a CEO in a smaller firm. Therefore, the argument in the previous 
paragraph that the ownership itself will serve as sufficient payoff, will no longer 
be accepted by the CEO. Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that CEOs in large 
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firms were compensated $1.85 per $1000 change in shareholder wealth, 
compared to CEOs in smaller firms that were compensated $8.05 per $1000 
change in shareholder wealth. These figures strengthen the argument for a bonus 
payment for a CEO in a large firm since the individual pay-off from stock 
ownership is not sufficient remuneration. 
 
5.6 Does bonus or any other variables affect company performance?   
 
The next test performed in this research study was to test whether bonus or any of 
the other explanatory variables had any significant effect on the performance of 
the company. As mentioned we have three performance variables and they have 
been tested separately in econometric models 2, 3, and 417. The results obtained 
are as follow: 
 
ROE as dependent variable 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.4365558 
R2 0.190581 
Adjusted R2 0.1580742 
Standard Error 24.305433 
Observations 260 
 
  
Coefficients
Standard 
Error 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
Intercept -11.779688 14.812333 -0.795262 0.427218 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.036663 0.045467 0.806358 0.420806 
CEO Age 0.279715 0.276880 1.010239 0.313361 
CEO Base Salary -0.000002 0.000001 -1.922988 0.055622 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.005282 0.149483 0.035332 0.971843 
Stock option program -3.635189 3.375791 -1.076841 0.282594 
Raw materials and Industrials 3.017164 4.302742 0.701219 0.483821 
Financial sector -7.201031 4.708413 -1.529397 0.127435 
IT-sector, Telecommunication and Media 
& Entertainment 
 
-12.281174 
 
5.469409 
 
-2.245430 
 
0.025618 
Medium sized firms 18.297189 3.938846 4.645318 0.000006 
Large sized firms 24.454476 5.339846 4.579622 0.000007 
Table 23: ROE as dependent variable 
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The previous table does not indicate that bonus should have any impact on the 
ROE for a company. Neither does any of the other explanatory variables fall 
within the significance level of this study. It might be important to note that CEO 
base salary falls just short of indicating a negative relationship with the 
performance variable ROE. One might argue that a high base salary does not 
serve as a good enough incentive for the CEO, since he will just sit on his 
position and collect his salary. However, it is hard to draw any conclusions based 
on this table since the significance levels are not completely fulfilled. Moreover, 
one can see that a few of the dummy variables fall within our 0.05 significance 
level. But, we believe that it would be too speculative to try to analyze it further 
in order to explain why they do fall within this range. Therefore, we believe that 
the tests performed in sections 5.6, and 5.7, where we test each size, and each 
industry sector individually will serve as a better indicator for the importance of 
industry sector, and size for ROE.   
 
ROA as dependent variable  
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.41406643 
R2 0.17145101 
Adjusted R2 0.13817595 
Standard Error 18.1889007 
Observations 260 
 
  
Coefficients
Standard 
Error 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
Intercept 2.708713 11.084767 0.244364 0.807150
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.017302 0.034025 0.508512 0.611545
CEO Age 0.031613 0.207202 0.152569 0.878862
CEO Base Salary -0.000002 0.000001 -2.525378 0.012179
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.002467 0.111865 0.022055 0.982422
Stock option program -3.479795 2.526263 -1.377447 0.169611
Raw materials and Industrials 4.548681 3.219945 1.412658 0.159005
Financial sector -7.867555 3.523527 -2.232864 0.026447
IT-sector, Telecommunication and Media 
& Entertainment 
 
-1.762446 
 
4.093016 
 
-0.430598 
 
0.667133
Medium sized firms 13.392119 2.947624 4.543361 0.000009
Large sized firms 19.918503 3.996058 4.984538 0.000001
Table 24: ROA as dependent variable 
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Table 24 presents the impact of bonus and other explanatory variables on the 
performance variable ROA. One can clearly see that the bonus has no effect on 
the ROA, since the significance level is nowhere near the required level of 0.05. 
However, it is clear that the CEO base salary shows a weak negative significance 
to the ROA. The explanation to this may be derived from the idea of promotion 
tournaments explained in section 3.2. Since the CEO has no more possibilities to 
improve his title and position, he will sit and collect his salary, without any 
performance incentives to take on any additional risk. The results obtained in this 
study strengthen the arguments put forward by many previous researchers that a 
variable portion of the salary might be the only way to motivate the CEO to take 
on additional risk. 
 
Once again some of the dummy variables show indications that they are of 
significance. However, as mentioned in the previous test, we believe it would be 
more sufficient to draw conclusions from the specific tests performed later on. 
The explanation for this is that the addition of these dummy variables are added 
to this econometric model in order to take up some of the shocks, and create a 
cleaner measure of our explanatory variables.  
 
EPS as dependent variable 
 
The results obtained from econometric model 418 when testing EPS as the 
dependent variable indicate no relationship between either bonus, or any of the 
other explanatory variables. These results are further presented in table 25 in 
Appendix 6. It is interesting to note that the variables are nowhere near a 
significant relationship. The reason for this result is hard to explain, and it is 
difficult to draw any valuable conclusions as to why this result has been obtained. 
However, it is obvious that using EPS as a performance measure for 
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remuneration among Sweden’s Listed companies does not result in a very good 
explanation. EPS differs from the other two performance measures, ROE and 
ROA, since it is not considered a traditional accounting measure, and one might 
think that a CEO remuneration system is more likely to be based on an 
accounting measurement.  
 
5.7 Is CEO compensation and company performance affected differently 
depending on the size of the company?  
 
When performing our analysis on the size effect among Sweden’s Listed 
companies we have applied econometric model 5 presented in section 4.5. Each 
regression has been tested for each size category, small, medium, and large sized 
companies.  
 
5.7.1 Small Sized Companies 
 
The first tests performed were in the category containing small firms. The 
regression results are presented in Appendix 7. We had expected to find a 
negative relationship between outstanding shares owned by the CEO, and 
bonuses. This hypothesis derives from the theory of ownership incentives, and its 
counter-cyclical relationship to bonus, since an increase in share value will lead 
to increase in wealth for the CEO, and a bonus would not be necessary. However, 
the regression model for small firms did not indicate this relationship. In fact, 
none of the variables presented in our model seemed to be significant. We found 
no significance between any of our variables, neither with bonus as a dependent 
variable, nor with any of our performance variables as dependent variables. 
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5.7.2 Medium Sized Companies 
 
The next step was to apply our regression model on medium sized firms in order 
to test whether we could establish some significance for any of our variables. 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 83.0378 32.4125 2.5619 0.0123 
CEO Age -0.7182 0.6335 -1.1337 0.2603 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0118 0.3147 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -1.1774 0.5248 -2.2434 0.0276 
Stock option program -11.1904 8.5004 -1.3165 0.1918 
 ROE 0.2265 0.2818 0.8037 0.4239 
ROA -0.6716 0.3554 -1.8898 0.0624 
EPS 0.7967 0.5766 1.3817 0.1709 
Table 30: Medium Size: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
The complete results are illustrated in appendix 8. As the table above indicates, 
our expected theory regarding CEO ownership’s negative relationship with bonus 
turned out to be significant for medium sized firms. We believe that a CEO in a 
medium sized company may be more exposed to the impacts of a cash bonus and 
how it will affect his tax situation. A CEO for a large firm has compensation high 
enough that he is already in the highest tax-bracket, whereas a CEO in a medium 
sized firm may experience a substantial tax jump depending on the size of his 
bonus. Hence, equity based compensation that will be taxed at a much lower rate 
might be viewed as much more favorable.  
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -52.2531 23.7168 -2.2032 0.0304 
% Bonus of Base  Salary -0.0106 0.0836 -0.1270 0.8992 
CEO Age 1.4423 0.4539 3.1776 0.0806 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6532 0.5155 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.8957 0.3946 2.2699 0.0258 
Stock option program -9.5753 6.4922 -1.4749 0.1441 
Table 31: Medium Size: ROE as dependent variable 
 
Furthermore, as presented above we can conclude that a positive relationship 
exists between outstanding shares owned by the CEO, and the performance 
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variable ROE. This significance follows the theories presented by Mehran 
(1995), where Jensen and Murphy conclude that a higher rate of ownership will 
create incentives to boost performance, since it will promote greater willingness 
towards risk taking. 
 
5.7.3 Large Sized Companies 
 
Finally, we have applied our econometric models on large firms, and the result is 
further presented in appendix 9. When testing the regression model towards the 
performance variables ROE, and ROA we find a significant negative relationship 
for CEO base salary. Milgrom and Roberts (1992 p. 428) illustrate how a CEO in 
a company that has won “his” promotion tournament may sit and collect his 
salary with no more incentive to climb the corporate ladder. The negative 
relationship between CEO base salary and company performance in our sample 
further strengthens these theories. Therefore, a high salary alone may increase the 
CEO’s unwillingness to take on additional risk and thereby decrease the 
execution of value maximizing decisions for the stockholders.  
 
5.8 Is CEO compensation and company performance affected differently 
depending on which industry sector it belongs to?    
 
In this section of our Master Thesis we are trying to find any empirical evidence 
about what variables are of significance within certain industry sectors of the 
economy. Is there any sufficient evidence among Sweden’s Listed companies that 
the predicted theories involving principal agency problems and incentive 
contracts presented by previous research, influence CEO compensation and 
company performance?  
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5.8.1 Raw Material and Industrial Sector 
 
For our first test we implemented econometric model 619, and the result is 
presented in appendix 10. The raw material and industrial sector follows the 
theories explained previously in this empirical study since outstanding shares 
owned by the CEO, and the existence of a stock option program show a 
significant negative relationship with bonuses.  
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -23.351542 47.608094 -0.490495 0.625004 
CEO Age 0.971198 0.880282 1.103280 0.272914 
CEO Base Salary 0.000003 0.000002 1.503707 0.136237 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -1.211949 0.345917 -3.503587 0.000724 
Stock option program -29.867316 7.399387 -4.036458 0.000115 
ROE 1.268955 0.679187 1.868344 0.065042 
ROA -0.318896 0.672674 -0.474072 0.636623 
EPS 0.034762 0.542167 0.064117 0.949023 
Table 38: Raw material and industrial sector: bonus as dependent variable 
 
This follows the ideas presented previously that both of these incentive programs 
will work independently of a paid bonus, since the CEO will experience a 
sufficient payoff in times of good company performance, since his stock 
ownership will result in increased individual wealth.  
 
Moreover, when evaluating the performance variables as dependent variables, the 
expected result is once again achieved, since both bonus and existence of stock-
option program indicate a significant positive relationship to the overall 
performance of the company. This clearly indicates that within this sector of the 
economy, incentive contracts will accomplish increased company performance, 
hence, serve the purpose they have been created for, by the stockholders, in the 
first place.  
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Furthermore, base salary indicates a negative significance when evaluating ROA. 
Once again this is evidence that a high salary does not lead to increased 
performance since the CEO will sit on his position and collect his high salary, 
with no fear of loosing his title. 
 
One explanation as to why this particular industry sector follows the traditional 
theories and ideas regarding principal agency theories and incentive contracts, 
might be that it is considered as a fairly solid industry, that has not gone through 
any significant ups and downs over the past few years. Traditionally Sweden has 
a long history within this particular sector and this might be an explanation for its 
solidity, and stability. Another explanation might be that there have not been any 
significant technological changes over the past few years, which would impose 
ambiguity on the present CEO.   
 
5.8.2 Financial Sector  
 
The next sector of evaluation is the financial sector. The results obtained for this 
sector are presented in more detail in appendix 11. The financial sector displays 
the same tendencies as the raw material and industrial sector, since the existence 
of a stock-option program shows a significant positive relationship to ROE, and 
ROA. This indicates that the financial sector follows the ideas regarding stock-
options as a sufficient incentive for increased performance. The first thought 
might be that the financial sector has gone through rough times and an indication 
of this should be mirrored in our regression analysis. However, what one might 
fail to remember is that many of the companies in the financial sector are highly 
active within real estate which has proved to be extremely solid during this four 
year period. The real estate market has a tendency to move counter-cyclical to the 
stock-market, and therefore many of these companies have been able to perform 
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fairly well. Moreover, the idea of awarding the CEO in equity based 
remuneration serves as a plausible incentive.   
 
5.8.3 Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals, and Service Sector 
 
Within the industry sector, which includes companies specialized in consumer 
goods, pharmaceuticals, and services, we have found a result that is rather 
controversial compared to the two previous sectors, and previous theories. The 
results of our regression model are presented in appendix 12. The reason for this 
controversy is further explained because of the fact that the existence of a stock-
option program is positively related to the bonus. It is hard to explain this 
situation but one idea might be that the volatility of this sector requires an 
extremely high variable remuneration. Since the volatility regarding new and 
untested products may lead to a failure and no variable payoff, it is important that 
the CEO feels that the possibility of a very high payoff exists if things turn out 
successfully. 
 
Secondly, we have found that the existence of a stock-option program has a 
significant negative relationship to all three performance variables. Additionally, 
base salary indicates a positive relationship to ROE.  
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 24.26566921 28.15574698 0.8618372 0.3932478
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.087763208 0.096041164 0.9138083 0.3655827
CEO Age -0.275319613 0.536095675 -0.5135643 0.6100147
CEO Base Salary 3.38365E-06 1.48052E-06 2.2854442 0.0269439
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.325469569 0.393527669 0.8270564 0.4124749
Stock option program -25.19191887 7.768488436 -3.2428341 0.0022057
Table 47: Consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, and service sector: ROE as dependent variable 
 
It is interesting to evaluate the cause for these results. One explanation might be 
grounded in the high volatility in this sector. With volatility one may note the 
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insecurity regarding the launch of new and untested products within the consumer 
goods, and pharmaceutical sector. Even in the service sector new and 
entrepreneurial ideas may cause insecurity and ambiguity regarding the 
companies’ future presence. All these factors serve as an explanation for the 
significant levels obtained in the regression model, since a CEO in this sector 
might prefer a high base salary, instead of a more risky variable portion of 
remuneration. A high base salary itself will serve as sufficient security, and 
insurance, independent of performance of new products, or services. This security 
regarding his remuneration will serve as sufficient incentive to boost 
performance. 
 
5.8.4 IT, Telecommunication, and Media & Entertainment  
 
The final sector under evaluation for this Master Thesis includes companies 
involved in IT, telecommunication, and media & entertainment. An important 
note is that this part of the economy has gone through particular financial distress 
over the years involved in this study. The table illustrated in appendix 13 is also a 
reflection of these tough conditions, since the existence of a stock-option 
program shows a significant negative relationship to ROE, and ROA. Unlike the 
sector involving consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, and services, which goes 
through volatility regarding new products, this industry sector has suffered from 
very harsh overall conditions which may imply that a remuneration paid out as 
equity is based too much on the general tendencies of the market, and thereby 
responsible for a situation where the CEO feels like he has no possibility to 
influence the company stock performance. This will obviously lead to a situation 
where the incentive of stock options no longer work as an incentive, since there is 
no possibility that it will create additional individual wealth for the CEO. 
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One highly speculative thought might be that during times of harsh financial 
distress for an entire sector, where the CEO himself might not be able to 
influence the performance of the company stock price much, the presence of a 
high base salary may serve as a better incentive for performance, since he will 
feel like there is no possible way to increase personal wealth through equity 
based compensation.  
 
5.8.5 Additional Thought 
 
In addition to the findings presented above regarding the different industry 
sectors, it is important to note that each sector index is not included as a variable 
in our econometric models. One thought may be that a CEO bonus is linked to a 
general industry sector index and company performance exceeding the general 
index will result in a bonus. However, since the companies are not obligated to 
reveal information regarding the constraints and criteria of the remuneration 
system in the annual reports, this is just a hypothesis. The decision not to include 
the sector index in the study is based on the grouping of two or three sectors in 
each of our sector variables. Since we have grouped companies from similar 
sectors together in order to receive a larger sample we believe that an average 
index over the four year period may lead to a skewed index since our groupings 
do not contain the same amount of companies from each sector.          
 
5.9 Conclusion of Empirical Findings 
 
It is clear that we have not found any relationship between CEO bonus and 
company performance among Sweden’s Listed companies. This finding further 
strengthens the results presented by previous researchers such as Murthy and 
Salter (1975); Aupperle, Figler, and Lutz (1991); and Akhigbe, Madura, and 
Tucker (1995). Additionally, we were not able to find any evidence that a paid 
bonus has any significant impact on company performance. However, it is 
- 50 - 
important to note that our study is of a general nature and we therefore cannot 
neglect the possibility that there may exist a strong relationship between CEO 
compensation and company performance in some companies. Thus, since our 
study is of general nature we have not been able to detect any significance for any 
one company in particular. 
 
We can also conclude that EPS is not a very good measurement when testing the 
relationship between CEO and company performance. We base this conclusion 
on the fact that we were not able to detect any significance when using EPS as a 
dependent variable. Furthermore, the CEO age variable did not record any 
significance in any of our tests. This contradicts some of the theories regarding an 
older CEOs ability to gain experience and specific knowledge, and how it can 
have a positive impact on company performance.    
 
Since our purpose involved more than just a testing of all the companies on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange we divided our sample by size and by industry sector 
in order to find the impact of certain variables and their effect on CEO 
compensation and company performance. Here we were able to discover that 
within certain company sizes and industry sectors the results followed the 
presented theories regarding principal-agency problem, and incentive contracts. 
We were expecting to find that high ownership by the CEO would serve as 
sufficient payoff since it would lead to increased wealth when the stock price 
increased. This was only true for medium size companies, which is something 
that was a little bit surprising. Within large companies we found that ownership 
itself does not lead to increased performance since it is impossible for the CEO to 
have a large enough piece of the ownership to feel compensated enough for good 
performance. Instead our data indicates that some form of variable compensation 
serves as the right incentive to boost CEO performance. 
 
- 51 - 
Moreover, we found that in industry sectors that are of a more solid nature, such 
as raw material and industrial companies that do not go through much volatility 
regarding new product launching, either an equity based compensation through 
option-programs or a bonus will serve as sufficient compensation, since it will 
lead to increased personal wealth in times of good company performance. In 
more volatile sectors that go through continuous technological changes and that 
are heavily dependent on research results such as IT, telecommunication, 
pharmaceuticals and consumer goods, etc., a better solution would be to reward 
the CEO with a higher base salary, or the possibility of an extremely high 
variable payoff, through bonuses and stock-options. 
 
A final thought would be that during times of very harsh financial distress within 
a specific industry sector, a high base salary would serve as the most favorable 
form of compensation. This can be explained by the existing market conditions 
that will have a negative effect on the stock prices for a majority of the 
companies within a certain sector which in turn will lead to external stress for the 
CEO. This is because he feels that there is no possible way for him to achieve a 
positive result, and thereby he cannot increase his personal wealth through equity 
based compensation.  
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6 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
The relationship between CEO compensation and company performance is a 
topic that has recently received a great amount of media attention. Many previous 
researchers have studied this topic and tried to identify certain CEO, and 
incentive variables that are of greater importance than others. The principal-
agency problem is an issue that has been of great concern when determining 
sufficient remuneration for the CEO, and how to create the right incentives to 
perform in the best interest of the shareholders. 
 
In order to test the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance among companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange we have 
used the OLS method to perform our regression analyses and created different 
models that will help us test the existence of such a relationship. We have tested 
whether the company performance impacts the CEO bonus or if the counter-
cyclical relationship exists where the bonus itself affects the company 
performance. Additionally, we have tested whether any of our other variables 
have any significant impact on the bonus or company performance. 
 
The result obtained from our econometric models clearly indicates that company 
performance does not affect CEO bonus. Neither does CEO bonus affect 
company performance.   
 
Additionally to the findings presented above we have been able to identify that 
within certain company sizes and industry sectors the theories regarding principal 
agency problem and incentive contracts are strictly followed, whereas in 
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companies from certain sizes and industry sectors these relationships are not 
present.  
 
6.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Throughout the duration of this Master Thesis we have encountered different 
ideas and interesting views on other possible areas to study within CEO 
compensation and company performance. This section serves as a starting point 
for future research studies that may be performed in the same subject area.  
 
Since our study revolves around cash compensation solely for the CEO it would 
be of great interest to include additional compensation variables for the CEO, 
such as pension plans, value of stock-option plans, and amount and conditions of 
severance pay. This would give a better overall and more complete overview of 
the entire remuneration paid out to the CEO. 
 
Secondly it could be of great interest to perform a study on all the companies 
within a certain sector in order to see how the compensation plans are structured, 
and see whether the incentive programs enhance the performance of the CEO. 
One could investigate whether the CEO bonus is linked to the company 
performance in comparison to the general index for that specific sector. 
 
Another interesting angle would be to use different denominations for company 
performance. As mentioned previously in this study it could be of great interest to 
look at Tobin’s Q, and EVA as potential variables for company performance. 
However, since we believe that it would be beyond the scope of our study we 
have decided not to include them as performance variables. 
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A final suggestion for future research projects could be to include more 
executives or board members in order to see whether someone other than the 
CEO is of greater importance for the performance of the company, and thereby 
investigate whether the payment scheme should be reorganized and someone 
other than the CEO should be compensated with the highest remuneration.   
- 56 - 
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Appendix 1 
 
Company Performance Measures 
According to Peterson and Peterson performance evaluation measures should 
fulfill the following requirements: 
 
• Not be sensitive to accounting choices and methods 
• Evaluate current management decisions in conjunction with expected future 
results 
• Consider the risk of investment decisions 
• Not penalize managers for circumstances that are beyond their control 
 
As mentioned previously, the performance measure applied for this research 
study is considered as a traditional evaluation. These traditional performance 
measures do not meet the requirements posted above, since most of them do not 
control for risk. Moreover, they are very sensitive to accounting choices.   
 
Other measurements applied when researching company performance are EVA, 
and Tobin’s Q. 
 
EVA. “EVA represents the economic profit of the firm and is computed by 
subtracting the firm’s cost of capital from the firm’s adjusted operating profit, net 
operating profit after taxes (NOPAT). Positive levels of EVA indicate that 
management has been “adding value” through previous investments.”20  
EVA is calculated through the application of the following formula: 
 
))(( CapitalWACCNOPATEVA −=  
                                                           
20 Peterson and Peterson (Website) 
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Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is classified as a traditional performance measure. 
However, it is fundamentally different from other traditional performance 
measures since it does not use accounting data. When calculating Tobin’s Q, one 
estimates future investment opportunities, market power, and management 
quality.  
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated through the application of the following formula: 
 
Assets of Valuet Replacemen
Assets of ValueMarket   Q sTobin' =  
 
The application of these two additional performance measures would involve a 
procedure too complicated for this research study. The sample size is so 
numerous that the time constraint imposed for this study works as a limitation as 
to what can be done. Therefore, since it would be beyond the scope of this study 
we have chosen to apply the more traditional measurements. Another important 
reason for the application of ROA, ROE, and EPS is that in order to make a better 
comparison to previous studies which have used these measurements, we believe 
it is necessary for us to apply similar performance measurements. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Industry Sectors as denominated by Affärsvärlden 
 
Raw Materials 3 companies     
Industrial Sector 21 companies 
Consumer Goods 7 companies 
Pharmaceuticals 5 companies 
Service Sector 1 company 
Financial Sector 16 companies 
IT- Sector 8 companies 
Telecommunication 2 companies 
Media and Entertainment 2 companies 
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Appendix 3 
 
Residual plots in order to test for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Bonus as dependent variable: 
 
Bonus as Dependent Variable
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Graph 1: Residual Plot Bonus as Dependent Variable 
 
 
ROE as dependent variable: 
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Graph 2: Residual Plot ROE as Dependent Variable 
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Residual plot ROA as dependent variable: 
 
ROA as Dependent Variable
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Graph 3: Residual Plot ROA as Dependent Variable 
 
 
Residual plot EPS as dependent variable: 
 
EPS as Dependent Variable
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Graph 4: Residual Plot EPS as Dependent Variable 
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Appendix 4 
 
Correlation 
Matrix 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix 
 
1. % Bonus of Base Salary    13. ROE  
2. CEO Age    14. ROA 
3. CEO Base salary    15. EPS 
4. % of Outstanding Shares Owned by CEO 
5. Stock Option Program   
6. Raw Materials and Industrials 
7. Financial              
8. Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals and Service 
9. IT, Telecommunication, and Media & Entertainment   
10. Small Sized Firms   
11. Medium Sized Firms 
12. Large Sized Firms  
- 68 - 
- 69 - 
Appendix 5 
 
F-test in order to test for significance 
 
Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Restricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 6 49404,807 
Residual 253 303088,9 
Total 259 352493,71 
Table 10: All companies Restricted 
 
 
Unrestricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 10 17717,923 
Residual 121 113691,54 
Total 131 131409,46 
Table 11: Small  companies Unrestricted 
 
  df SS 
Regression 10 31730,911 
Residual 117 156463,36 
Total 127 188194,27 
Table 12: Large companies Unrestricted 
 
    
H0: β2=0, β3=0, β4=0, β5=0, β6=0, β7 =0, δ0=0, δ1=0, δ2=0, δ3=0, δ4=0  
H1: β2 ≠0, β3≠0, β4≠0, β5 ≠0, β6 ≠0, β7≠0, δ0≠0, δ1≠0, δ2≠0, δ3≠0, δ4≠0 
 
)11260/()36.15646354.11369(
10/)36.15646354.11369(9.303088(
−+
+−=F  
F= 3,036 
(size dummies are omitted since sample is divided by size, one sector dummy is 
omitted in test) 
Critical Value = 1.83  
 
Reject H0 
 
One or more of our Variables is of significance 
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ROE as dependent variable 
 
Restricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 4 8612,7164 
Residual 255 173119,81 
Total 259 181732,53 
Table 13: All companies Restricted 
 
 
Unrestricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 8 16884,321 
Residual 123 114700,76 
Total 131 131585,08 
Table 14: Small companies Unrestricted 
 
  df SS 
Regression 8 7917,9725 
Residual 119 28729,852 
Total 127 36647,824 
Table 15: Large companies Unrestricted 
 
 
 
H0: β2=0, β3=0, β4=0, β5=0, δ0=0, δ1=0, δ2=0, δ3=0, δ4=0  
H1: β2 ≠0, β3≠0, β4≠0, β5 ≠0, δ0≠0, δ1≠0, δ2≠0, δ3≠0, δ4≠0 
 
)9260/()852.2872976.114700(
8/)852.2872976.114700(81.173119(
−+
+−=F  
 
F= 6.494 
 
 
Critical Value = 1.94 
 
 
Reject H0 
 
 
One or more of our Variables is of significance 
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ROA as dependent variable 
 
Restricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 4 1907,8245 
Residual 255 97516,823 
Total 259 99424,648 
Table 16: All companies Restricted 
 
Unrestricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 8 10795,595 
Residual 123 68552,954 
Total 131 79348,549 
Table 17: Small companies Unrestricted 
 
 
  df SS 
Regression 8 4827,3418 
Residual 119 12534,892 
Total 127 17362,234 
Table 18: Large companies Unrestricted 
 
 
H0: β2=0, β3=0, β4=0, β5=0, δ0=0, δ1=0, δ2=0, δ3=0, δ4=0  
H1: β2 ≠0, β3≠0, β4≠0, β5 ≠0, δ0≠0, δ1≠0, δ2≠0, δ3≠0, δ4≠0 
 
)9260/()892.12534942.68552(
8/)892.12534942.68552(832.97516(
−+
+−=F  
 
F= 6.357 
 
Critical value = 1.94 
 
Reject H0 
 
One or more of our Variables is of significance 
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EPS as dependent variable 
 
Restricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 4 852,23816 
Residual 255 28236,301 
Total 259 29088,539 
Table 19: All companies Restricted 
 
Unrestricted Sums of Square 
 
  df SS 
Regression 8 1605,4039 
Residual 123 19096,124 
Total 131 20701,528 
Table 20: Small companies Unrestricted 
 
  df SS 
Regression 8 1441,7551 
Residual 119 5298,4761 
Total 127 6740,2312 
Table 21: Large companies Unrestricted 
 
 
H0: β2=0, β3=0, β4=0, β5=0, δ0=0, δ1=0, δ2=0, δ3=0, δ4=0  
H1: β2 ≠0, β3≠0, β4≠0, β5 ≠0, δ0≠0, δ1≠0, δ2≠0, δ3≠0, δ4≠0 
 
)9260/()4761.5298124.19096(
8/)4761.5298124.19096(301.28236(
−+
+−=F  
 
F= 4.941 
 
Critical value = 1.94 
 
Reject H0 
 
One or more of our variables is of significance 
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Appendix 6 
 
EPS as dependent variable   
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.361905003 
R2 0.130975231 
Adjusted R2 0.096074638 
Standard Error 10.07560126 
Observations 260 
 
  
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
Intercept -1.2889855 6.1403209 -0.2099215 0.8339006
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0039454 0.0188480 0.2093285 0.8343629
CEO Age 0.0519465 0.1147781 0.4525825 0.6512435
CEO Base Salary -0.0000003 0.0000005 -0.6494483 0.5166473
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.0833590 0.0619669 1.3452183 0.1797786
Stock option program -2.0376320 1.3994041 -1.4560712 0.1466326
Raw materials and Industrials 3.8687230 1.7836634 2.1689759 0.0310313
Financial sector 3.3171740 1.9518306 1.6995194 0.0904702
IT-sector, Telecommunication and Media & 
Entertainment 
 
-1.5706056 
 
2.2672949 
 
-0.6927223 
 
0.4891294
Medium sized firms 2.6032916 1.6328135 1.5943594 0.1121241
Large sized firms 6.6880953 2.2135855 3.0213855 0.0027785
Table 25: EPS as dependent variable 
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Appendix 7 
 
Small Size: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.349169508 
R2 0.121919345 
Adjusted R2 0.045087288 
Standard Error 24.28693976 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -26.0765 24.1956 -1.0777 0.2844 
CEO Age 0.6429 0.4701 1.3675 0.1753 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 0.6832 0.4965 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.3912 0.2100 -1.8626 0.0662 
Stock option program 6.0574 5.4782 1.1057 0.2722 
ROE 0.0742 0.2174 0.3413 0.7338 
ROA 0.0209 0.2882 0.0724 0.9424 
EPS 0.0590 0.2105 0.2802 0.7800 
Table 26: Small Size: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Small Size: ROE as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.2702787 
R2 0.0730506 
Adjusted R2 0.0165293 
Standard Error 31.904169 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -14.4918 31.5310 -0.4596 0.6470 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.1723 0.1455 1.1841 0.2398 
CEO Age 0.5565 0.6180 0.9005 0.3705 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7546 0.0831 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.2097 0.2784 -0.7533 0.4534 
Stock option program -7.3227 7.0915 -1.0326 0.3048 
Table 27: Small Size: ROE as dependent variable 
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Small Size: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.2677203 
R2 0.0716742 
Adjusted R2 0.0150689 
Standard Error 24.315556 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 3.345465 24.031165 0.139214 0.889623 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.126054 0.110927 1.136365 0.259114 
CEO Age 0.221803 0.471011 0.470907 0.638957 
CEO Base Salary -0.000011 0.000005 -2.106662 0.058204 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.113174 0.212143 -0.533479 0.595145 
Stock option program -3.869187 5.404765 -0.715884 0.476096 
Table 28: Small Size: ROA as dependent variable 
 
 
Small Size: EPS as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.2321503 
R2 0.0538938 
Adjusted R2 -0.0037956 
Standard Error 13.66496 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 6.020177 13.505136 0.445769 0.656939 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.042534 0.062339 0.682298 0.496973 
CEO Age -0.032586 0.264701 -0.123104 0.902326 
CEO Base Salary -0.000001 0.000003 -0.287898 0.774151 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.103331 0.119221 0.866720 0.388624 
Stock option program -5.106226 3.037393 -1.681121 0.096545 
Table 29: Small Size: EPS  as dependent variable 
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Appendix 8 
 
Medium Size: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.4107226 
R2 0.1686931 
Adjusted R2 0.0959537 
Standard Error 33.082674 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 83.0378 32.4125 2.5619 0.0123 
CEO Age -0.7182 0.6335 -1.1337 0.2603 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0118 0.3147 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -1.1774 0.5248 -2.2434 0.0276 
Stock option program -11.1904 8.5004 -1.3165 0.1918 
ROE 0.2265 0.2818 0.8037 0.4239 
ROA -0.6716 0.3554 -1.8898 0.0624 
EPS 0.7967 0.5766 1.3817 0.1709 
Table 30: Medium Size: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Medium Size: ROE as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.397589 
R2 0.158077 
Adjusted R2 0.1067403 
Standard Error 25.548511 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -52.2531 23.7168 -2.2032 0.0304 
% Bonus of Base  Salary -0.0106 0.0836 -0.1270 0.8992 
CEO Age 1.4423 0.4539 3.1776 0.0806 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6532 0.5155 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.8957 0.3946 2.2699 0.0258 
Stock option program -9.5753 6.4922 -1.4749 0.1441 
Table 31: Medium Size: ROE as dependent variable 
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Medium Size: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3150637 
R2 0.0992651 
Adjusted R2 0.0443423 
Standard Error 18.526658 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 0.516787 17.198405 0.030049 0.976101 
% Bonus of Base  Salary -0.067101 0.060636 -1.106635 0.271688 
CEO Age 0.497208 0.329139 1.510633 0.134726 
CEO Base Salary -0.000007 0.000004 -1.784550 0.078033 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.204103 0.286149 0.713274 0.477701 
Stock option program -2.770416 4.707860 -0.588466 0.557837 
Table 32: Medium Size: ROA  as dependent variable 
 
Medium Size: EPS as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.2170933 
R2 0.0471295 
Adjusted R2 -0.0109724 
Standard Error 8.2029131 
Observations 88 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -7.8743420 7.6148124 -1.0340822 0.3041379 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0244175 0.0268472 0.9094987 0.3657525 
CEO Age 0.2308510 0.1457305 1.5840956 0.1170213 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000002 0.0000016 0.1534687 0.8784057 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.1576620 0.1266961 1.2444102 0.2168938 
Stock option program -1.4651663 2.0844647 -0.7028981 0.4841100 
Table 33: Medium Size: EPS  as dependent variable 
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Appendix 9 
 
Large Firms: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3153877 
R2 0.0994694 
Adjusted R2 0.0165258 
Standard Error 41.721083 
Observations 84 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 71.168906 41.636172 1.709305 0.091475 
CEO Age -0.833081 0.852086 -0.977696 0.331327 
CEO Base Salary 0.000002 0.000002 0.839271 0.403950 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.629423 0.507878 -1.239319 0.219041 
Stock option program -4.848294 11.802607 -0.410782 0.682389 
ROE 1.374594 0.815953 1.684649 0.096159 
ROA -0.509152 0.872604 -0.583485 0.561294 
EPS -0.728601 0.626843 -1.162335 0.248737 
Table 34: Large Size: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Large Firms: ROE as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.360795 
R2 0.130173 
Adjusted R2 0.0744149 
Standard Error 9.5855453 
Observations 84 
 
  
Coefficients
Standard 
Error 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
Intercept 6.9979880 9.6670774 0.7238990 0.4712933 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0430014 0.0256293 1.6778216 0.0973848 
CEO Age 0.2658959 0.1935007 1.3741337 0.1733360 
CEO Base Salary -0.0000011 0.0000005 -1.9796963 0.0492654 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.1104927 0.1144082 -0.9657763 0.3371410 
Stock option program -3.2031370 2.6513591 -1.2081114 0.2306546 
Table 35: Large Size: ROE as dependent variable 
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Large Firms: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.399414 
R2 0.1595315 
Adjusted R2 0.1056554 
Standard Error 8.6984732 
Observations 84 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 9.7086052 8.7724601 1.1067141 0.2718191 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0236222 0.0232575 1.0156796 0.3129222 
CEO Age 0.1959871 0.1755937 1.1161401 0.2677888 
CEO Base Salary -0.0000010 0.0000005 -2.1306322 0.0362705 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.1761890 0.1038205 -1.6970531 0.0936738 
Stock option program -4.5363685 2.4059952 -1.8854437 0.0630935 
Table 36: Large Size: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Large Firms: EPS as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.268352 
R2 0.0720128 
Adjusted R2 0.0125265 
Standard Error 8.0602263 
Observations 84 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -0.1463454 8.1287845 -0.0180034 0.9856821 
% Bonus of Base  Salary -0.0098712 0.0215510 -0.4580412 0.6481964 
CEO Age 0.2261777 0.1627095 1.3900701 0.1684619 
CEO Base Salary -0.0000004 0.0000004 -1.0032888 0.3188239 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.0940367 0.0962027 0.9774849 0.3313512 
Stock option program -1.0090573 2.2294563 -0.4526024 0.6520914 
Table 37: Large Size: EPS as dependent variable 
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Appendix 10 
 
Raw Materials and Industrial Sector: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.5294186 
R2 0.28028405 
Adjusted R2 0.22303392 
Standard Error 31.1955445 
Observations 96 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -23.351542 47.608094 -0.490495 0.625004 
CEO Age 0.971198 0.880282 1.103280 0.272914 
CEO Base Salary 0.000003 0.000002 1.503707 0.136237 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -1.211949 0.345917 -3.503587 0.000724 
Stock option program -29.867316 7.399387 -4.036458 0.000115 
ROE 1.268955 0.679187 1.868344 0.065042 
ROA -0.318896 0.672674 -0.474072 0.636623 
EPS 0.034762 0.542167 0.064117 0.949023 
Table 38: Raw material and industrial sector: bonus as dependent variable 
 
Raw Materials and Industrial Sector: ROE as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.4084438 
R2 0.1668263 
Adjusted R2 0.1205389 
Standard Error 10.455125 
Observations 96 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 26.7850409 14.7792440 1.8123417 0.0732679 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.1173615 0.0334654 3.5069510 0.0007093 
CEO Age -0.3564801 0.2820207 -1.2640208 0.2094866 
CEO Base Salary -0.0000010 0.0000005 -1.9555518 0.0536200 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.1874132 0.1208101 1.5513041 0.1243384 
Stock option program 7.4069307 2.5753292 2.8761103 0.0050258 
Table 39: Raw material and industrial sector: ROE as dependent variable 
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Raw Materials and Industrial Sector: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.4239106 
R2 0.1797002 
Adjusted R2 0.1341279 
Standard Error 9.8831078 
Observations 96 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 45.5631661 13.9706465 3.2613499 0.0015669 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0881055 0.0316344 2.7851127 0.0065235 
CEO Age -0.6662130 0.2665909 -2.4990086 0.0142683 
CEO Base Salary -0.0000013 0.0000005 -2.6101970 0.0105986 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.1339496 0.1142004 1.1729349 0.2439170 
Stock option program 5.1707625 2.4344286 2.1240149 0.0364116 
Table 40: Raw material and industrial sector: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Raw Materials and Industrial Sector: EPS as dependent variable 
 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3669346 
R2 0.134641 
Adjusted R2 0.0865655 
Standard Error 7.4647319 
Observations 96 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 2.9792352 10.5520584 0.2823369 0.7783335 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0507303 0.0238936 2.1231799 0.0364835 
CEO Age -0.0112588 0.2013567 -0.0559146 0.9555338 
CEO Base Salary 0.0000006 0.0000004 1.5445188 0.1259718 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.0171988 0.0862558 -0.1993932 0.8424050 
Stock option program 2.7714516 1.8387290 1.5072649 0.1352450 
Table 41: Raw material and industrial sector: EPS as dependent variable 
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Appendix 11 
 
Financial Sector: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.4448646 
R2 0.1979045 
Adjusted R2 0.0976426 
Standard Error 41.37253 
Observations 64 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 100.890010 43.246814 2.332889 0.023272 
CEO Age -1.610677 0.891882 -1.805931 0.076304 
CEO Base Salary 0.000008 0.000005 1.657717 0.102967 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.722187 0.377971 -1.910694 0.061169 
Stock option program -15.225925 14.981777 -1.016296 0.313859 
ROE -0.143640 0.546233 -0.262964 0.793544 
ROA 0.779507 0.859634 0.906789 0.368404 
EPS -0.288255 0.394961 -0.729832 0.468535 
Table 42: Financial Sector: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Financial Sector: ROE as dependent variable 
 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3815369 
R2 0.1455704 
Adjusted R2 0.0719126 
Standard Error 28.611845 
Observations 64 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -50.041874 30.259547 -1.653755 0.103580 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.137614 0.089844 1.531698 0.131034 
CEO Age 1.202188 0.612370 1.963173 0.054427 
CEO Base Salary -0.000006 0.000003 -1.943512 0.056812 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.121514 0.262921 -0.462172 0.645687 
Stock option program 21.409229 9.631820 2.222761 0.030144 
Table 43: Financial Sector: ROE as dependent variable 
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Financial Sector: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3851552 
R2 0.1483446 
Adjusted R2 0.074926 
Standard Error 19.594222 
Observations 64 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -37.329102 20.722616 -1.801370 0.076843 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.102660 0.061528 1.668510 0.100605 
CEO Age 0.841895 0.419369 2.007530 0.049360 
CEO Base Salary -0.000004 0.000002 -1.850935 0.069273 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.010714 0.180056 -0.059501 0.952757 
Stock option program 15.727362 6.596150 2.384325 0.020402 
Table 44: Financial Sector: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Financial Sector: EPS as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.2533973 
R2 0.0642102 
Adjusted R2 -0.0164614 
Standard Error 17.216522 
Observations 64 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -4.8312713 18.2079897 -0.2653380 0.7916899 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0187283 0.0540615 0.3464265 0.7302759 
CEO Age 0.2711737 0.3684794 0.7359264 0.4647414 
CEO Base Salary -0.0000008 0.0000020 -0.4208503 0.6754197 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.2043626 0.1582065 1.2917458 0.2015690 
Stock option program -2.2028983 5.7957269 -0.3800901 0.7052669 
Table 45: Financial Sector: EPS as dependent variable 
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Appendix 12 
 
Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals, and Service Sector: Bonus as dependent 
variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.6083039 
R2 0.3700336 
Adjusted R2 0.2698117 
Standard Error 34.837168 
Observations 52 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 96.393054 52.670541 1.830113 0.074012 
CEO Age -1.649229 0.946054 -1.743272 0.088271 
CEO Base Salary 0.000004 0.000002 1.510278 0.138121 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -1.731326 0.588233 -2.943268 0.005168 
Stock option program 32.353933 12.508855 2.586482 0.013081 
ROE 0.186701 0.586709 0.318217 0.751826 
ROA 0.207257 0.544140 0.380890 0.705118 
EPS -1.081485 2.237716 -0.483299 0.631280 
Table 46: Consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, and service sector: Bonus as dependent variable 
 
Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals, and Service Sector: ROE as dependent 
variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.529762154 
R2 0.28064794 
Adjusted R2 0.202457499 
Standard Error 22.52443658 
Observations 52 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 24.26566921 28.15574698 0.8618372 0.3932478 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.087763208 0.096041164 0.9138083 0.3655827 
CEO Age -0.275319613 0.536095675 -0.5135643 0.6100147 
CEO Base Salary 3.38365E-06 1.48052E-06 2.2854442 0.0269439 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.325469569 0.393527669 0.8270564 0.4124749 
Stock option program -25.19191887 7.768488436 -3.2428341 0.0022057 
Table 47: Consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, and service sector: ROE as dependent variable 
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Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals, and Service Sector: ROA as dependent 
variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.4860128 
R2 0.2362084 
Adjusted R2 0.1531876 
Standard Error 18.995276 
Observations 52 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 4.3260443 23.74426526 0.1821932 0.8562316
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0861616 0.0809933 1.0638115 0.2929668
CEO Age 0.1056325 0.452099456 0.2336487 0.8162944
CEO Base Salary 2.292E-06 1.24855E-06 1.8353643 0.0729217
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.3444586 0.331869205 1.0379347 0.3047258
Stock option program -21.334726 6.551310829 -3.2565583 0.002121
Table 48: Consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, and service sector: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Consumer Goods, Pharmaceuticals, and Service Sector: EPS as dependent 
variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.6021045 
R2 0.3625298 
Adjusted R2 0.2932395 
Standard Error 3.6916207 
Observations 52 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 18.0536979 4.6145589 3.9123345 0.0002995
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.0046953 0.0157406 0.2982925 0.7668232
CEO Age -0.2721854 0.0878629 -3.0978430 0.0033187
CEO Base Salary 0.0000003 0.0000002 1.0880167 0.2822556
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.0493256 0.0644968 -0.7647754 0.4483111
Stock option program -3.1738826 1.2732089 -2.4928216 0.0163352
Table 49: Consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, and service sector: EPS  as dependent variable 
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Appendix 13 
 
IT, Telecommunication, and Media & Entertainment: Bonus as dependent 
variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.5723417 
R2 0.327575 
Adjusted R2 0.2099006 
Standard Error 17.084354 
Observations 48 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept 57.42624 27.18743 2.11223 0.04096 
CEO Age -1.65769 0.74091 -2.23737 0.03090 
CEO Base Salary 0.00002 0.00001 2.61246 0.01260 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO 0.16837 0.54341 0.30983 0.75830 
Stock option program 8.28592 6.79077 1.22017 0.22954 
 ROE 0.30674 0.19974 1.53568 0.13249 
ROA -0.36719 0.22436 -1.63665 0.10955 
EPS 0.23166 0.69415 0.33374 0.74032 
Table 50: IT, Telecommunications, and Media & Entertainment: Bonus  as dependent variable 
 
IT, Telecommunication, and Media & Entertainment: ROE as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.454385343 
R2 0.20646604 
Adjusted R2 0.111997712 
Standard Error 36.18614506 
Observations 48 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -100.50316 47.62538 -2.11029 0.04083 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.37595 0.31669 1.18712 0.24185 
CEO Age 3.54026 1.37753 2.57001 0.01381 
CEO Base Salary -0.00003 0.00001 -1.70940 0.09476 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -2.12653 1.09945 -1.93417 0.05985 
Stock option program -30.22871 13.82635 -2.18631 0.03442 
Table 51: IT, Telecommunications, and Media & Entertainment: ROE  as dependent variable 
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IT, Telecommunication, and Media & Entertainment: ROA as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3612169 
R2 0.1304777 
Adjusted R2 0.0269631 
Standard Error 27.492222 
Observations 48 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -7.65329 36.18312 -0.21152 0.83351 
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.06899 0.24061 0.28673 0.77573 
CEO Age 1.07566 1.04657 1.02779 0.30993 
CEO Base Salary -0.00001 0.00001 -0.87484 0.38664 
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -1.25684 0.83530 -1.50465 0.13990 
Stock option program -21.35605 10.50449 -2.03304 0.04840 
Table 52: IT, Telecommunications, and Media & Entertainment: ROA  as dependent variable 
 
IT, Telecommunication, and Media & Entertainment: EPS as dependent variable 
 
Regressionstatistics 
Multiple-R 0.3984186 
R2 0.1587374 
Adjusted R2 0.0585871 
Standard Error 5.5791167 
Observations 48 
 
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-stat P-value 
Intercept -3.758228 7.342798 -0.511825 0.611454
% Bonus of Base  Salary 0.068122 0.048827 1.395172 0.170298
CEO Age 0.228862 0.212385 1.077579 0.287372
CEO Base Salary -0.000002 0.000002 -0.966972 0.339093
% of outstanding shares owned by CEO -0.279812 0.169512 -1.650692 0.106261
Stock option program -4.144288 2.131722 -1.944103 0.058602
Table 53: IT, Telecommunications, and Media & Entertainment: EPS as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
